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Abstract 
  
Recent theoretical work on economic geography emphasizes the interplay of 
transport costs and plant-level increasing returns. In these models, the spatial 
distribution of demand is a key determinant of economic outcomes. In one 
strand, it is argued that higher demand gives rise to a more than proportionate 
increase in production, a result known as the home market effect. Another 
strand emphasizes the effects of market sizes on factor prices. We highlight the 
theoretical connection between these two strands. Using data on 57 European 
regions, we show how wages and employment respond to differentials in what 
we call real market potential, a discounted sum of demands derived from the 
theory. 
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1 Introduction
The academic attempt to describe, explain, and predict the spatial distribu-
tion of economic activity has come to be called, among other things, economic
geography. Perhaps the best inspiration for this field comes from satellite pic-
tures of the earth at night. Instead of the blues, greens, and browns of daytime
photos, we see only the light generated by human activity. These lights ap-
pear to be highly concentrated, leading to the central question of economic
geography: What forces cause agglomeration (here defined as the spatial con-
centration of mobile resources)? Until the 1990s, the field took an eclectic
approach, content to allow for a variety of mechanisms. Models incorporated
this eclecticism by specifying the agglomeration economy as a multiplicative
external effect in the production function depending on some measure of the
amount of local activity.
The publication of Krugman (1991) marked a turning point for the economic
geography literature. For the next decade, theorists concentrated with near
exclusivity on models that moved agglomerative forces out of the produc-
tion function and into the interaction between transport costs and plant-level
scale economies. After the accumulation of a decade of theory, economists
have begun to subject Krugman’s approach—called New Economic Geogra-
phy (NEG)—to empirical scrutiny. While it is too early to be sure, we consider
the seminal contributions to the empirical literature to be Davis and Wein-
stein (1999,2003), Hanson (2005), and Redding and Venables (2004). These
papers statistically link the spatial distribution of production and wages to
the spatial distribution of demand.
The theory reveals that a complex construction of access to demands originat-
ing from all regions—the real market potential (RMP) —is a central feature
of the economic fortunes of a region. We estimate the influence of RMP on
wages, following the Redding and Venables (2004) method. That is, we con-
struct RMP as a weighted sum of importer fixed effects estimated in a bilateral
trade equation. The structural interpretation of the fixed effects allows for a
close connection between theory and empirics. We extend their approach in
two respects. First, while they related per capita incomes to a cross-section
of nation-level market potentials, we incorporate industry, time and intra-
national variation. The underlying theory relates to firm-level iso-profit func-
tions, suggesting the importance of greater disaggregation in testing. Second,
we consider two dimensions of adjustment to geographic variation in demand:
prices and quantities. We investigate whether high demand leads to higher
wages, higher employment, or both. These price and quantity aspects are in-
terdependent in theory: the presence of a strong wage response to demand
should dampen the production response. We argue that this combined treat-
ment of price and quantity effects sheds light on the difficulty past studies have
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had in finding “home market effects”—more than proportionate production
responses to geographic demand variation.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we use in Section 2 an augmented version
of the standard model of new economic geography to highlight, in Section 3,
the common origins of the “home market effect” and “wage equation” econo-
metric specifications. We show that these approaches can be seen as polar
cases of a more general model that does not lend itself easily to estimation.
Instead, we suggest two simple empirical strategies for integrating the analy-
sis of wage and employment responses to market potential. Section 5 then
proceeds to implement these strategies using a data set on an industry-level
wages, employment, and bilateral trade spanning the period 1985–2000, and
detailed in Section 4. The data, except for bilateral trade, are available at the
regional level, allowing us to examine intra-national wage and employment re-
sponses. Section 6 concludes and offers insights for further investigation along
this path.
2 Real Market Potential and Profit
In this section we show how the spatial distribution of demand affects the
prospective profits of different production locations in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman
(DSK) model of monopolistic competition and trade. There are K + 1 indus-
tries of which K have increasing returns to scale (IRS) and imperfect competi-
tion. Sector 0 is a numeraire sector with constant (or even decreasing) returns
and perfect competition. As we discuss in the next section, the interactions
between the IRS industries and sector 0 determine the way agglomeration
forces manifest themselves in general equilibrium. 1
Let Ei denote total expenditure of region i on the representative IRS indus-
try. 2 In the standard model, Ei is given by multiplying total income by the
expenditure-share parameter from an upper-level Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion. 3 Thus, the Ei do not depend directly on goods prices but they would
be influenced by wages and by migration.
The Ei constitute the total local demand available for all firms capable of
1 For fully developed models of these interactions, see Davis (1998), Puga (1999)
and Holmes and Stephens (2005).
2 The empirics involve K = 13 manufacturing industries and 15 years. We estimate
industry-year specific parameters. All variables except human capital have industry-
year variation. We suppress industry and year subscripts to avoid subscript clutter.
3 In our industry-level data, E comprises both final and intermediate consumption.
The underlying theory involves downstream firms with production functions that
are CES in intermediate inputs.
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serving market i. The demand relevant to a particular firm producing in region
i differs from Ei for two reasons. First, that firm can export to other regions
j 6= i and thereby tap into their local demands. Second, that firm must divide
each of the local markets with its competitors. The share of each market the
firm obtains depends on its production and trade costs relative to its rivals.
We now show how to incorporate these considerations in a formal measure of
the size of the market in a multi-region setting.
The DSK model assumes that within each industry, single-plant firms compete
by offering a single-variety to consumers at delivered prices, pij, given as the
product of a mill price pi and the ad valorem trade cost, τij. Trade costs include
all transaction costs associated with moving goods across space and national
borders. Assume further that all varieties substitute symmetrically for each
other with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES), σ, and that firms from
the same region charge the same mill price. These assumptions imply market
shares in region j for a representative firm from i as
zij =
p1−σi τ
1−σ
ij∑
k nkp
1−σ
k τ
1−σ
kj
. (1)
The denominator in (3) plays a key role in the empirical analysis of this paper.
Redding and Venables (2004) describe it as the “sum of supply capacities,
weighted by transport costs.” They call it “supplier access” and abbreviate it
as SAj. We will call it the supply index and denote it
Sj =
∑
k
nkp
1−σ
k τ
1−σ
kj . (2)
A location that is served by a large number of nearby and low-price sources
will have a high supply index, Sj, and will therefore be a market where it is
difficult to obtain a high market share.
From (1), it is apparent that trade costs influence demand more when the
elasticity of substitution is high. Indeed many results in the DSK framework
depend on the term φij ≡ τ 1−σij , called the “phi-ness” of trade by Baldwin et
al. (2003). It ranges from 0, where τij and σ are high enough to eliminate all
trade, to 1, where trade costs are negligible.
Total export sales for a firm from i to j are given by xij = zijEj. Substituting
in (1) and utilizing the φij and Sj notation we obtain
xij = p
1−σ
i φijEj/Sj. (3)
How profitable will those exports be? The DSK model assumes constant mar-
ginal costs,mi, and a fixed cost per plant, fi. Each firm maximizes gross profits
in each market leading to a single mill price for each origin i that is a simple
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mark-up over marginal costs:
pi =
miσ
σ − 1 .
The gross profit earned in each market j for a variety produced in region
i is given by piij = xij/σ. Summing the profits earned in each market and
subtracting the plant-specific fixed cost, fi, we obtain the net profit to be
earned in each potential location i:
Πi =
∑
j
xij/σ − fi = 1
σ
m1−σi RMPi − fi, (4)
where RMPi =
∑
j φijEj/Sj. RMP is an abbreviation of Real Market Po-
tential. Redding and Venables (2004) derive the same term (except they do
not use φij notation) and call it “market access.” We use the term “market
potential” to reflect the similarity of RMP to the Harris (1954) original spec-
ification:
∑
j Ej/Dij. Harris’ market potential implicitly treats Sj as constant
and approximates φij with 1/Dij. We use the term “real” to underline the
importance of discounting expenditures by the supply index, Sj,, which is in-
versely related to the local industry price index. “Nominal” Market Potential
(NMP) would be given by
∑
j φijEj. NMP can be thought of as a pure measure
of the size of the available market. RMP incorporates the notion that a large
market that is extremely well-served by existing firms might offer considerably
less potential for profits than a smaller market with fewer competitors in the
vicinity.
In empirical work, we wish to examine the relationship between the observed
spatial distribution of expenditures, Ei, and the spatial pattern of wages and
employment. Hence we need to restate the profit equation in terms of these
variables. We follow the standard Krugman (1980) assumptions that labor
is the only factor and there is both a fixed and variable component to firm-
level labor requirements. However, we modify the model to take into account
cross-regional variation in human capital. In particular, we assume that labor
requirement per firm, `, depends on both output per firm, q, and average years
of schooling, h as follows:
`i = (α+ βqi) exp(−ρhi), (5)
where α and β measure fixed and variable labor requirements in “effective”
(education-adjusted) labor units. The return to human capital, denoted ρ,
shows the percentage increase in productivity from an extra year of education.
These assumptions imply fixed costs of fi = α exp(−ρhi)wi and marginal costs
of mi = β exp(−ρhi)wi. Profits can therefore be restated in terms of wages as
Πi =
1
σ
(β exp(−ρhi)wi)1−σRMPi − fi = α exp(−ρhi)wi. (6)
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Our production function assumptions imply a revised version of the S term
used in RMP. Namely, the supply index should be re-expressed in terms of
industry employment instead of the number of varieties. The model assumes all
plants in the same location employ the same number of workers, `i. Output
per firm does not vary across locations in this model and is given by q =
(α/β)(σ− 1). Hence industry employment in a region, denoted Li, is given by
Li = ni exp(ρhi)(α+ βqi) = ασ exp(−ρhi)ni. (7)
In contrast with the standard DSK model, employment is not strictly pro-
portional to the number of firms. Human capital abundant areas have lower
employment per firm. We obtain the new supply index by inverting (7) and
substituting out ni in (2), yielding
Si = κ
∑
j
Lj exp(σρhj)w
1−σ
j φij, (8)
where κ is a composite parameter given by β1−σ(σ− 1)σ−1/(σσα). This equa-
tion tells us that the supply index, the term that discounts expenditures in
the RMP summation, is increasing in the amount of education-adjusted em-
ployment that has good access (high φij) to the market in question. Note that
σ acts as amplifier: when it is large, human capital, wages, and transport costs
have stronger impacts.
3 Two paths towards spatial equilibrium
Spatial equilibrium requires that markets clear and no mobile agent has a
unilateral incentive to relocate. For firms, this means that profits should be the
same in all regions: Πi = Π¯. If workers are perfectly mobile, spatial equilibrium
also requires real wage equalization. We will consider the worker’s condition
later, but now concentrate on the equilibrium condition for firms. With free
entry, the equal profit level is zero, so we solve for an iso-profit equation,
Πi = 0, relating production costs in region i—which depend on wages and
human capital in that region—to market potential:
βσ−1ασ(wi exp(−ρhi))σ = RMPi. (9)
Consider the effect of a positive shock to expenditure, Ei, in a region. Other
things equal, RMPi would rise, breaking the equality in (9) and requiring an
adjustment for the economy to return to equilibrium. We consider two paths
towards equilibrium: The first way to restore equality is to raise wi. The second
path would be a rise in the supply index, Si, pushing RMPi back down to its
initial level, restoring equality. This change in Si could be achieved by an
increase in the number of firms in the industry-region which would require an
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increase in the industry-region employment, Li. Rising Si leads to increased
competition and reduced profits in region i.
The relative magnitudes of price (wi) or quantity (Li) adjustment to cross-
regional variation in demand Ei depends chiefly on the mobility of workers
between sectors and between regions. One polar case assumes that frictionless
international trade in sector 0 ties down wi and that there is no inter-regional
migration. Rather, sector 0 supplies a pool of workers sufficient to allow for all
adjustment to take place on the production side. In that case, sector 0 output
must be positive in all regions. A second polar case assumes that labour is
not available to the industry-region from either other sectors or other regions.
This induces a wage rise in high demand regions.
Two important strands in the empirical literature investigate these two po-
lar cases of the equilibration mechanism. We now review the theoretical and
empirical linkages between the two approaches.
The first approach assumes factor price equalization. This makes wages in-
variant to demand and leaves employment adjustment as the only mechanism
for equalizing profits. In our version of the model, one assumes equalization
of human-capital adjusted wages, that is wi exp(−ρhi) = wj exp(−ρhj). With
costs equalized, equal profits require equal real market potential: RMPi =
RMPj.
In a two-country model, RMP equalization leads to the piecewise linear share
equation first identified by Helpman and Krugman (1985). Using λ = n1/(n1+
n2) to denote the share of output manufactured in region 1 and θ = E1/(E1+
E2) to denote region 1’s share of expenditures, we have
λ = 1/2 +M(θ − 1/2), (10)
whenever (1− 1/M)/2 ≤ θ ≤ (1+ 1/M)/2. In the Helpman-Krugman version
λ corresponds to the shares of the number of firms, production, and employ-
ment. 4 The slope of the share equation, M , is greater than one and depends
solely on the “phi-ness” of trade:
M = dλ/dθ = (1 + φ)/(1− φ) > 1.
A decrease in transport costs, which raises φ, increases the responsiveness of
employment to home demand.
Researchers have tried to estimate M and test whether it exceeds one, as
predicted in the DSK model. Davis and Weinstein (1999, 2003) introduced
this empirical strategy and implement it with data on Japanese regions and
4 In our human capital augmented version, λ can be expressed as a share of
education-adjusted employment: λi = Li exp(ρihi)/(Li exp(ρihi) + Lj exp(ρjhj)).
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OECD countries. Head and Ries (2001) use US-Canada panel data and also
test whether trade liberalization increased M as predicted. Both studies find
mixed results (Head and Mayer, 2004a, review in detail the findings of these
and related papers).
The theory underlying estimation of M relies upon very restrictive assump-
tions. The first assumption is factor price equalization (FPE). If, on the other
hand, wages in a region are increasing in demand in that region, then Head
and Mayer (2004a) show that the magnification effect can be overturned. It
also turns out that the share equation of Helpman and Krugman (1985) only
applies in a two-country world. Behrens, Lamorgese, Ottaviano, and Tabuchi
(2004) show that testing for increasing returns using M > 1 as the criterion is
inappropriate in a multi-country world. They suggest alternative methods for
multi-country implementations of the theory. Their methods assume FPE and
this leads to RMP equalization. We present some tests for RMP equalization
in the results section as an alternative way to assess the FPE approach to
equilibrium in the DSK model.
Redding and Venables (2004) pioneer the second polar path that loads all the
response to demand differences into wages. As Redding and Venables put it,
“Here we take Ei and ni as exogenous and simply ask, given the locations of
expenditure and of production, what wages can manufacturing firms in each
location afford to pay?”
Solving for the wage in equation 9, we obtain
wi =
(
RMPi
βσ−1ασ
)1/σ
exp(ρhi). (11)
Except for notation and the inclusion of human capital, (11) is the same as
(4.27) in Fujita et al. (1999).
In terms of equation (11), RMP is considered exogenous and wages fully adjust
to equate profits across locations. In this paper we also estimate the wage
equation as a first step. Then, we study the extent to which deviations from
this iso-profit locus lead to wage and employment responses.
The initial wage-RMP relationship can be estimated by taking logs of equation
(11), which gives a linear-in-logs equation:
lnwi = a+ b lnRMPi + ρhi + i, (12)
where a = −(1/σ) ln(βσ−1ασ) and b = 1/σ. The intercept, a, depends on
the input requirement coefficients α and β. These are likely to vary across
industries, in part because of variation in capital intensities. For this reason we
always estimate (12) with industry specific constants. Most of our estimations
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also allow b and ρ to vary across industries.
Equation (12) derives solely from the firm’s spatial equilibrium condition. By
focussing on this equation, the home market effect literature and the Redding-
Venables wage equations implicitly or explicitly assume workers to be immo-
bile. Worker mobility complicates matters considerably. This is because work-
ers care about real wages, introducing a second spatial equilibrium condition
that also depends on both wages and the supply index. 5 To obtain stable,
interior asymmetric distributions of workers that satisfy the firm and worker
equilibrium conditions, one could follow Helpman (1998) and add a housing
sector. Areas with high demand have high nominal wages to keep firms in equi-
librium while high housing prices equalize real wages. Hanson (2005) follows
this approach in his study of wage variation across US counties.
Our study is at the regional level in Europe. Migration between regions in
different EU nations seems small enough to approximate as zero. 6 Even mi-
gration within EU countries is small relative to the US. 7 The absence of large-
scale migration in Europe might mean that mobility costs are high enough to
make it reasonable to ignore the workers’ spatial equilibrium condition. How-
ever, if this inference were incorrect, it could lead to bias in the estimation
of (12). For example, suppose there is a shock to housing availability in region
i. This would induce in-migration, raising expenditure, Ei. But it would also
tend to reduce wages in region i since the price level would be lower. This
means that RMP would not be independent of the error term, i in (12), mak-
ing OLS inconsistent. We therefore use instrumental variables as a robustness
check.
The standard theory treats the wage equation as a relationship that holds
at all points in time. Thus, it can be estimated in cross-section (Redding
and Venables, 2004) or in time-differences (Hanson, 2005). We will begin by
estimating equation (12) as a set of annual cross-sections that we then average
to generate a single estimate of the RMP elasticity for each industry. This may
be thought of as the long-run relationship.
The problem with these approaches is that, at any given moment, the actual
wage may differ from the wage that would put a region on the iso-profit
5 Recall that the price index for an increasing returns industry is inversely related
to the supply index.
6 Puga (2002) reports that “only 1.5% of EU citizens live in a Member State dif-
ferent from where they were born.”
7 Obstfeld and Peri (1998) show that the average interregional net migration rate
over the period 1970–1995 is two to four times lower in the UK, Germany and
Italy than in the United States. They also find econometric evidence of much lower
migration response to shocks in labor demand for European countries, as compared
to the United States.
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equation. If large changes in wages incur adjustment costs, then we should
expect only partial adjustment to deviations in regional wages from the iso-
profit relationship. Following Nerlove (1958) we can formalize these dynamics
by first reformulating equation (12) as an equation for the equilibrium wage,
denoted w∗:
lnw∗it = at + b lnRMPit + ρhi. (13)
The at are year-specific intercepts and regional education attainment hi is
assumed constant due to data limitations. In the partial adjustment model,
actual wages, wit, move towards equilibrium wages, w
∗
it, according to
lnwit − lnwi,t−1 = γ(lnw∗it − lnwi,t−1) + uit. (14)
Nerlove defined γ as the “elasticity of adjustment.” In this expression, the uit
are IID errors in the adjustment process. Substituting (13) into (14) yields the
dynamic estimating equation
lnwit − lnwi,t−1 = a′t + b′ lnRMPit + c′ lnwi,t−1 + ρ′hi + uit, (15)
where a′t ≡ γat, b′ ≡ γb, c′ ≡ −γ, and ρ′ ≡ γρ.
Equation 15 can be estimated via OLS as long as the adjustment errors uit are
not serially correlated. By estimating γ = −c′ we can assess the speed of wage
adjustment. One can then recover an estimate of the long-run equilibrium
elasticity of RMP b by dividing the short-run elasticity, b′ by γ.
We also should consider the possible role of employment adjustment. It would
take the form of a change in real market potential from t−1 to t. This is taken
into account in (15) since the equation conditions on contemporaneous RMP.
Estimated γ can therefore be thought as the wage adjustment parameter after
employment adjustment has potentially taken place. Estimation of (15) does
not, however, reveal the existence and size of this employment adjustment,
which is also of interest. As there is no closed form for Lit, we cannot readily
extend the approach above to estimation of an employment adjustment pa-
rameter. Nevertheless, for comparison purposes, we also estimated an ad hoc
regression of changes in employment on one-year lagged levels of the deviations
from the cross-section wage equation (12). That is we estimate
lnLit − lnLi,t−1 = η
(
aˆ+ bˆ lnRMPi,t−1 + ρˆhi − lnwi,t−1
)
. (16)
The estimate of η indicates how much employment in an industry-region in-
creases if, in the preceding year, its RMP was high relative to the education-
adjusted wage. By comparing estimates of γ and η we hope to offer additional
insights into the main modes of regional adjustment to deviations from the
iso-profit equation.
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4 Data
The core empirical part of this paper explains the variance of industry-level
wages and employment of European regions with the real market potential of
those regions. We first describe the data sources of explained variables and
then how explanatory ones are constructed.
4.1 Dependent variables
The set of regions under investigation incorporate 57 official Eurostat regions
using the NUTS 1 level of detail for Germany (11 regions), France (8 regions),
Italy (11 regions), the UK (11 regions), Spain (6 regions), the Netherlands
(4 regions), and Belgium (4 regions). Ireland and Portugal are considered as
single-region countries. NUTS 1 regions usually do not correspond to admin-
istrative areas in the different countries, but are instead groupings based on
a population range objective. 8 The advantage of using this level of geograph-
ical aggregation is that the availability of industry-level data is much better
across regions and time. For Ireland and Portugal, the problem is simplified
as national level data can be used.
There are two main sources of data for the industry-region data. The primary
source is the regional domain of industry-level statistics (called SBS) in Eu-
rostat CRONOS database. Data is available in this source in the NACE rev1
classification for the years 1985 to 2001. There are 13 industries in our dataset
for which the real market potential calculation for all regions can be easily
made. Regional data are difficult to collect in a consistent way in different
countries. The problems are exacerbated when working with industry detail,
due in particular to confidentiality issues. Those difficulties result in a well
known missing data problem for this type of dataset, emphasized in Combes
and Overman (2004). Data are mostly non-missing starting in 1993, when the
new NACE rev1 classification was adopted. Early years however, present lots
of missing data, which explains our use of the second source of data: the Eu-
rostat publication Structure and activity of industry annual inquiry, principal
results, regional data. It consists of 2-digit data in the old NACE classification
(called NACE70, which has an easy correspondence at the two-digit level with
NACE rev1), available for the same regions (in an older NUTS classification,
but fairly easy to match with the new one). An electronic version of the old
industry-region data comprises data for the years 1989 to 1992 but in fact
1992 has mostly missing values. We additionally used the printed version for
8 The NUTS regulation states that the average size of NUTS 1 regions in a country
should host between 3 and 7 million people.
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the years 1985 and 1987. Our rule is to use the new data from SBS whenever
it is available.
The wage variable wi uses the ratio of the wage bill over the number of employ-
ees Li in the NACE 2-digit industry-region. There are some concerns about
comparability across countries. For instance, some countries report data for
firms over 20 employees and some for the exhaustive set of firms (and some
countries change to report exhaustive data at some point). Also, there are
important variations in hours worked and the level of social charges across
European countries that affect the production costs of firms located there but
are not taken into account in wi. For this reason, we always run industry-year
regressions including country-level fixed effects, in order to capture those and
other nation-specific differences, in particular those related to labor market
institutions and taxes.
4.2 Independent variables
Our principal explanatory variable is RMPi, the real market potential of each
region i. Its calculation, described briefly below, follows Head and Mayer
(2004b), and the reader is referred to that paper for more detail.
The market potential of region i is expressed as RMPi ≡ ∑j φij(Ej/Sj), where
φij represents the ease of access of producers in i to consumers in region j and
Ej (the expenditure of region j) is discounted by the degree of competition
for that market (Sj). RMP could be estimated in a single-step wage equation
as in Hanson (2005), Brakman et al. (2004), and Mion (2004). 9 We follow a
different strategy, pioneered by Redding and Venables (2004), that exploits the
information from bilateral trade equations, which we view as part of the core
empirical content of the theory. The total value of exports from all ni firms
based in region i will be denoted Xij = nixij. From the firm-level demand
equation (3), we see that the log of bilateral export values is given by
lnXij = lnni − (σ − 1) ln pi + lnφij + lnEj − lnSj. (17)
Redding and Venables (2004) suggested that one could recover the unobserved
country-specific variables using exporter and importer fixed effects. To see this,
abbreviate the first two i-specific terms with FXi = lnni − (σ − 1) ln pi and
the last two j-specific terms with FMj = lnEj − lnSj.
The E/S component of real market potential can be estimated as the expo-
nential of the fixed effect on importer j, FM, in a bilateral trade equation.
9 This requires non-linear estimation since RMP is a non-linear function of the core
parameters.
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Unfortunately, bilateral trade data for the regions in our sample are not avail-
able. Therefore we have to rely on bilateral trade data between nations to
obtain the estimates used in the calculation of market potential. 10 Let I and
J denote two European countries in our sample. The estimated equation ex-
plains exports from I to J , XIJ , with importers and exporters fixed effects
(FXI and FMJ), and a three-component model of trade freeness. We assume
φIJ = d
−δ
IJ exp[(ξJ − ΛLANGIJ)BIJ + ζIJ ] (18)
The first component is bilateral distance, DIJ , measured as the weighted aver-
age of region-to-region distances for the two countries. The second component
is a reduction in freeness due to crossing a national border (BIJ = 1 if I 6= J
and zero otherwise). Following results in other papers (see Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2004), we allow border effects, −ξJ to vary across countries. The
model is parameterized so that sharing a common language dampens the bor-
der effect(LANGIJ = 1 for pairs of countries that share at least one official
language). The unmeasured determinants of trade freeness are captured in ζIJ ,
which is assumed to be an independent, zero-mean residual. Substituting (18)
into (17) yields the estimating equation
lnXIJ = FXI + FMJ − δ ln dIJ − ξJBIJ + ΛLANGIJ ·BIJ + ζIJ . (19)
Equation (19) requires the use of data on bilateral trade matched with produc-
tion at the 2-digit industry level. 11 Consistent trade and production data are
constructed by Eurostat (COMEXT and VISA databases respectively). Our
sample comprises the period from 1980 to 1995 and the fifteen 1995 members
of the European Union, plus Switzerland and Norway. We estimate the trade
regression for each of the 16 years and 13 industries, yielding industry, year
and country-specific estimates to construct market potential.
Estimating equation (19) allows us to calculate EJ/SJ = exp(FMJ). Assuming
homotheticity, regional expenditure is given by Ej = (yj/yJ)EJ , where yj/yJ is
region j’s share of national GDP. 12 We then must assume that Sj, the supply
index, is approximately constant within countries, i.e. Sj = SJ ,∀j ∈ J . Com-
bining these assumptions yields Ej/Sj = (yj/yJ) exp(FMJ). The calculation of
RMP also uses information on inter-regional distances, national borders, and
language commonality combined with the parameters estimated using nation-
level bilateral trade to obtain an estimate of the freeness of trade between
10 The existing work on sub-national bilateral trade flows uses regional trade inside
given countries, the United States for Wolf (2000) and France for Combes et al.
(2005) for instance. These papers show that gravity type equations also provide a
very good fit to those trade patterns with similar distance effect estimates.
11 Production data is needed to construct the internal trade flows observations XII ,
which enable identification of a country-specific border effect, −ξJ . Internal trade
is calculated as production minus total exports.
12 The GDP shares are obtained from the Eurostat REGIO database.
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each pair of regions:
φˆij = d
−δˆ
ij exp[(ξˆJ − ΛˆLANGij)Bij] (20)
The indicators for common language and crossing a national border are con-
structed such that LANGij = 1 and Bij = 0 for pairs from the same country
(I = J). Bilateral distance, dij is the great circle distance from the center of
region i to the center of region j for i 6= j. A region’s distance to itself is ap-
proximated as the average distance from the region center to all other points
in the region, assuming the center is literally at the center of a disk-shaped
region. These assumptions imply φˆii = d
−δˆ
ii = (2/3
√
areai/pi)
−δˆ. Combining
the estimated bilateral freeness estimates, fixed effects, and our expenditure
allocation rule, the real market potential of each region is calculated as
R̂MPi =
∑
j
φˆij(yj/yJ) exp(FMJ). (21)
The other important determinant of wages in our theoretical framework is
human capital. We use the labor force survey of Eurostat REGIO database,
which gives the share of employment by highest level of education attained
(primary, secondary or tertiary under the ISCED classification). Using this
data, we calculate an average number of education years of workers in each
region. This data is almost fully available across regions, but only exists for
recent years (1999 to 2002). We therefore make the assumption that differences
in human capital stocks vary relatively slowly over time and use the 1999–2002
averages for each region as a time-invariant regional characteristic.
5 Results
Recall that under factor price equalization, adjustment takes place entirely
through movements of firms, which requires equalization of RMP in all regions,
through changes in the supply index, S. A testable implication is that RMP
should be insensitive to its underlying components. In particular, suppose a
location has large internal demand (high Ei) or is near to other large markets
(low φijs for high Ejs). Then RMP equalization would imply adjustments in
employment to increase Si to offset these demand advantages.
13
Figures 1 and 2 relate our estimates of RMP to distance to Brussels and re-
gional expenditure for an illustrative industry (Electrical Machinery) in 1995.
13 The adjustment of Si to variation in Ei and φij is the multi-country analogue to
adjustment in λi to θi in the two-country share equations. Unfortunately, there is
no coefficient like M to use as a test for increasing returns.
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Fig. 1. RMP vs Distance to Brussels, Electric Machinery, 1995
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Fig. 2. RMP vs Expenditure, Electric Machinery, 1995
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The first figure makes it clear that RMP becomes larger as one approaches
the economic center of Europe. This relationship has already been illustrated
in Redding and Schott (2003) using country-level data. It suggests a failure
of factor price equalization (FPE), a failure that lends itself to an interesting
interpretation in terms of our theory. Since the regions close to Brussels tend
to have relatively high φij to large Ej regions, the figure shows that Si is not
responding enough to offset these advantages.
Figure 2 reinforces the case against RMP equalization. High Ei regions tend
to have higher RMPi, which should not be the case if the competition index
Si adjusts fast enough to compensate for the advantages yielded by large
Ei regions. The exceptions are the very small city-regions of Bremen (DE5),
Hamburg (DE6), and Berlin (DE3). These areas earn their high RMP by
virtue of very low internal distances, dii, which convert into very high φii.
This feature of the model should cause some concern since internal distances
are set using area-based rules that may not fairly reflect true accessibility. Both
figures 1 and 2 suggest that the movements of firms underlying the changes
in Si do not sufficiently reduce the profits to be earned in high RMP regions.
The theoretical framework developed in preceding sections then implies that
the rest of the adjustment will be made through changes in factor prices, with
high RMP regions yielding high factor rewards. This is indeed the case as can
be seen in figure 3, where high levels of wages are to be found in areas of high
market potential.
We now show that the figures depicting relationships for a single industry in
a single year are broadly representative of other industries and years. We run
the regressions of lnRMPi on ln di,BE1 and lnEi for each industry-year pair
(thus there are usually 56 region observations in each regression). We then av-
erage the annual results by industry and report the coefficients in Table 1. The
first four columns characterize the result for log distance to Brussels (BE1) as
the explanatory variable and the second four columns show the corresponding
results of log of apparent consumption. RMP is negatively related to distance
to Brussels in all industries and on average this relationship is large (-.52) and
very significant (-5.40). The positive correlations with lnE are less pronounced
(mainly because of the problematic city-regions mentioned above). Neverthe-
less, the correlation is always positive and significant on average. The result
that employment is not adjusting enough for RMP equalization to take place
is therefore a general one, carrying over all industries in our sample. Therefore
if profits are being equalized, it must be that it is being done through wage
differences, and we now turn to investigating this issue.
Table 2 estimates a human-capital augmented version of the log wage equa-
tion. 14 We find that even after controlling for years of education, RMP is
14 Redding and Schott (2003) consider human capital as their dependent variable.
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Fig. 3. Wages vs RMP, Electric Machinery, 1995.
associated with higher regional wages in each of the manufacturing indus-
tries. In some industries the average effect obtains an elasticity of as high as
0.20 (Clothing and Footwear had a elasticity of .41 in one year). This would
correspond in the model to a σ of 5, the value typically used in Krugman’s
illustrations of NEG, and very close to the 4.9 value found by Hanson (2005),
in his estimation of market potential influence on wages across counties in
the United States. The average industry has an elasticity of 0.12, correspond-
ing to a σ of about 8, very similar to the result estimated by Head and Ries
(2001) using an entirely different sample and methodology. The RMP effects
on wages are generally significant (the average t-statistic being 3.16).
The results in columns (5)-(8) show that education also has an important
influence on wages. The average return to a year of education is a high 0.14.
Statistical significance varies across industries, with 7 industries showing t-
statistics that would reject zero at the 5% level. These results are limited by
our use of education averaged over the four years when data is available (1999–
2002) to proxy for levels over the 1985–1995 period. Another limitation is the
use of regional averages, rather than individual data, for wages and education.
A massive literature in labor economics uses individual level data to investigate
We consider it as a control variable. In our data, as with theirs, education and RMP
are positively correlated. Hence RMP could have a direct effect on wages as well as
an indirect effect via the channel of encouraging higher levels of education.
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Table 1
Real market potential differences across regions
Distance to Brussels Apparent consumption
Industry Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
mean min max mean mean min max mean
Clothing and Footwear -0.68 -0.86 -0.57 -5.1 0.23 0.13 0.34 1.51
Textiles -0.61 -0.80 -0.52 -4.99 0.11 0.06 0.16 0.84
Motor Vehicles and Parts -0.61 -0.75 -0.46 -6.49 0.29 0.17 0.38 2.67
Rubber and Plastics -0.61 -0.62 -0.58 -5.65 0.3 0.28 0.33 2.43
Paper, Printing, & Publishing -0.60 -0.76 -0.52 -5.08 0.37 0.31 0.52 2.16
Non-metallic Mineral Products -0.58 -0.68 -0.50 -5.02 0.24 0.16 0.34 1.53
Metal-Primary -0.51 -0.69 -0.44 -5.52 0.33 0.29 0.37 3.03
Electronics -0.45 -0.51 -0.39 -5.00 0.37 0.31 0.47 5.09
Office Machines -0.44 -0.62 -0.30 -5.52 0.27 0.16 0.37 4.2
Precision Instruments -0.44 -0.49 -0.35 -5.89 0.23 0.14 0.31 3.48
Chemicals & Fibres -0.43 -0.53 -0.37 -5.96 0.28 0.26 0.32 3.06
Machinery -0.43 -0.54 -0.38 -5.9 0.33 0.27 0.43 4.72
Food, Drink, & Tobacco -0.41 -0.57 -0.37 -4.04 0.24 0.2 0.32 1.91
Average -0.52 -0.65 -0.44 -5.4 0.28 0.21 0.36 2.82
this relationship. Recent work finds that geographic variation in individual
skills accounts for a large amount of the intra-national geographic variation of
individual wages in the UK, France, and Italy. 15 Combes et al (2004) argue
that failure to control for cross-regional variation in skill composition biases
estimates of agglomeration effects upwards. When we re-estimate the wage
equations with education omitted, we find that the average coefficients on
real market potential are indeed inflated for all industries. The average across
all industries rises to .14, compared to the .12 reported in column 1 of Table 2.
These findings suggest that the human-capital augmented version of the wage
equation should become the standard approach.
Our results using industry-regions in the EU appear to corroborate results
from other studies (referred to previously) in which measures of market po-
tential have significant impacts on wages. There are, however, some specific
features of the market potential variable we use that cause concerns.
15 See Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002) for the UK, Combes, Duranton and Go-
billon (2004) for France, and Mion and Naticchioni (2005) for Italy.
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Table 2
Cross-sectional wage response to RMP and human capital
Real Market Potential Average Years of Education
Industry Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
mean min max mean mean min max mean
Clothing and Footwear 0.20 0.10 0.41 4.59 0.23 0.09 0.30 3.44
Textiles 0.19 0.06 0.30 4.30 0.15 -0.09 0.23 1.99
Office Machines 0.19 -0.04 0.48 1.47 0.24 0.04 0.65 1.80
Precision Instruments 0.17 0.15 0.21 2.39 0.22 0.09 0.38 2.06
Electronics 0.16 0.13 0.19 3.91 0.15 0.07 0.24 2.97
Food, Drink, & Tobacco 0.14 0.10 0.18 5.90 0.04 -0.08 0.11 0.80
Machinery 0.14 0.11 0.18 4.12 0.13 0.09 0.18 2.69
Chemicals & Fibres 0.10 0.06 0.16 3.97 0.15 0.09 0.25 2.50
Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.08 0.05 0.09 3.96 0.14 0.10 0.16 2.55
Paper, Printing, & Publishing 0.06 0.03 0.09 1.96 0.09 0.05 0.13 1.60
Motor Vehicles and Parts 0.05 0.00 0.10 2.06 0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.61
Rubber and Plastics 0.04 0.02 0.06 1.58 0.07 0.02 0.12 1.01
Metal-Primary 0.03 -0.09 0.08 0.90 0.12 -0.03 0.48 1.09
Average 0.12 0.05 0.19 3.16 0.14 0.03 0.25 1.93
First, the explanatory variable R̂MP is generated using coefficients estimated
in another regression. Pagan (1984) shows how OLS standard errors understate
true standard errors except in the case where b = 0, i.e. where RMP has no
effect. Our focus is on the magnitude of b, and Pagan (1984) establishes that
OLS coefficients are efficient estimators under fairly standard assumptions. He
also shows that the OLS t-statistic can be used to test the null hypothesis of
no effect of the generated variable.
Second, there is a potential simultaneity problem. Market potential, on the
right end side of the estimated equation, is a weighted sum of regional expen-
ditures in each of the industries. Those expenditures depend on incomes, and
therefore on wages, raising a concern a reverse causality in the estimation. A
positive shock to wi will raise Ei and consequently increase RMPi.
16 This
16 This is problem for all wage equations although it is slightly smaller here than in
Redding and Venables (2004) or Hanson (2005) because of the industry-level nature
of our empirics. For a lot of industries, a positive shock in the wage rate in i will
only marginally affect local overall income and expenditure in the same industry.
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will be all the more problematic since the φij tend to be small relative to φii:
In the case of extremely high inter-regional transport costs (φij = 0, ∀j 6= i),
only the local expenditure enters RMPi. To the extent that workers relocate
to regions offering higher real wages (as discussed in section 3), expenditure
will be even more endogenous.
One way to deal with the direct feedback from wi to Ei would be to calculate
market potential by summing over j 6= i. This is the approach taken in several
specifications estimated by Redding and Venables (2004) and also by Mion
and Naticchioni (2005). The exclusion of the own-region contribution has the
secondary benefit of obviating the need to specify a particular intra-regional
distance dii. The area-based approximation we use can lead to problems of in-
terpretation. Essentially the local market potential is given by Ei/
√
AREAi.
As Ei must be closely related to total employment in region i, the local RMP
contribution is very similar to a measure of employment density. Although in-
cluding the local term is problematic, excluding it is a far-from-ideal approach.
The main reason is that non-local RMP (NLRMP) treats regions as if they
were infinitely far from themselves. This causes inaccurate inversions for the
peripheral regions around the major capitals. For example in electronics in
1995, the use of NLRMP causes the region including London (South-East) to
fall from a rank of 6th to 31st. Meanwhile, its neighbor (East Anglia) jumps
from a rank of 20th to 3rd place. While it is useful to compare results of RMP
with those obtained for NLRMP, we do not view NLRMP as the preferred
specification.
A more promising approach to the simultaneity problem with RMP is to find a
good instrument, that is i) a variable that is not influenced by wages or worker
location choices but does have an impact on RMP, ii) a variable that does not
enter the wage equation directly. Redding and Venables (2004) use distance to
the nearest central place (Brussels, New York City, or Tokyo) as an instrument
for the market potential of each country in the world. We first follow this
precedent and take distance to Brussels as an instrument for RMP. Although
physical geography variables of this kind seem to meet the criteria above, the
choice of the reference points raises an endogeneity issue. The three cities are
chosen with the knowledge that they are high-wage centers. We prefer to use
region i “centrality,” measured as ln
∑
j d
−1
ij , as an instrument, because it does
not explicitly impose a center. We consider two forms for this variable. In “EU
centrality” we sum across all NUTS1 regions and countries used in our trade
estimation. As pointed out to us by a referee, the restriction to EU regions
implicitly determines a center. Furthermore, the location and prosperity of the
European Union was itself the outcome of an endogenous process. To respond
to these concerns, we also construct an instrument we call “Global centrality.”
For each region in our sample, we calculated the distance to the center of every
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Table 3
Robustness of Market Potential effects to alternative specifications
Measure or Instrument for Market Potential 1% Sigf. Coef.
(1) R̂MPi =
∑
j φˆij(yj/yJ) exp(FMJ) Yes 0.0963
(2) Harris: HMPi =
∑
j Ej/dij Yes 0.1749
(3) Non-local: ̂NLRMPi =∑j 6=i φˆij(yj/yJ) exp(FMJ) Yes 0.0785
(4) IV: Distance to Brussels Yes 0.0996
(5) IV: EU centrality
∑
j d
−1
ij Yes 0.0790
(6) IV: Global centrality
∑
j d
−1
ij Yes 0.0877
Note: Regressions on stacked data (13 industries, 11 years, 57 regions). All re-
gressions include the region’s average years of education, fixed effects for
industry-year pairs and country fixed effects.
inhabited 1 degree by 1 degree cell in the world population grid. 17 The sum
of these inverse distances depends on almost entirely exogenous geographic
features such as the location of bodies of water and uninhabitable climates
(deserts, ice).
Table 3 displays the results of our investigation of the problems we have identi-
fied in the RMP variable. It reports results of pooled regressions (13 industries,
11 years, 57 regions) using fixed effects for industry-years and countries. 18 All
specifications control for average years of education. The first row uses the
RMP constructed as before. Estimates in this column are slightly smaller (.10
vs .12) than the average value obtained in the industry level regressions in
Table 2.
The next row in Table 3 replaces RMP with the Harris (1954) form of market
potential: HMPi =
∑
j Ej/dij, where E represents regional expenditure in an
industry. This variable does not require coefficients estimated from a previous
regression, which accounts in part for its continued use in empirical work.
We obtain a larger coefficient than with RMP and the root mean squared
error (RMSE) of the regressions are approximately the same (.144 vs .145)
It is somewhat discouraging that results from a reduced form proposed by
geographers 50 years ago are so similar to the ones from the structural model.
However, the Harris form does not retain the structural interpretation of the
coefficient (as 1/σ) on log market potential.
Row 3 of Table 3 estimates the effect of log NLRMP, which differs from RMP
only by excluding the own region. The change in specification leads to smaller
17Data provided at www.na.unep.net/datasets/datalist.php3.
18 Industry-level IV estimates had high standard errors and are not reported in order
to save space.
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Table 4
Dynamic wage and employment adjustment to deviations from the iso-profit curve
RMP (SR): b′ Wage adj.: γ σ Emp. adj.: η
Industry coef. t-stat. coef. t γ/b′ coef. t
Machinery 0.088 2.28 0.51 2.36 5.75 0.05 1.18
Precision Instruments 0.040 2.71 0.10 2.77 2.49 0.07 1.27
Food, Drink, & Tobacco 0.038 4.60 0.22 4.67 5.85 0.01 0.08
Electronics 0.032 3.44 0.09 2.84 2.90 0.18 0.88
Motor Vehicles and Parts 0.027 4.65 0.26 6.74 9.64 0.08 1.61
Chemicals & Fibres 0.023 3.10 0.16 4.67 6.82 0.15 1.20
Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.018 5.06 0.14 6.36 7.88 -0.06 -1.55
Paper, Printing, & Publishing 0.016 2.65 0.16 3.32 9.95 0.06 2.26
Rubber and Plastics 0.010 3.39 0.11 3.86 10.48 0.10 2.66
Textiles 0.003 0.49 0.07 3.38 23.33 -0.11 -0.88
Metal-Primary -0.003 -0.54 0.09 1.78 - 0.14 1.36
Clothing and Footwear -0.005 -0.71 0.02 0.89 - -0.01 -0.21
Office Machines -0.081 -2.27 0.04 1.05 - -0.09 -0.93
Average 0.020 2.22 0.15 3.44 8.51 0.04 0.69
estimated impacts of market potential. One interpretation is that full RMP
is building in an urban density effect through the division by an area-based
internal distance measure. A second interpretation is that the exclusion of
the important contribution of the local market causes attenuation bias. Note
that the (unreported) coefficient on education jumps from .12 to .19 in this
specification.
The final three rows consider instrumental variable (IV) estimations of the
wage equation. The return to education in these regressions ranges between
.12 and .13. Row 4 uses distance to Brussels (the equivalent of the Redding
and Venables method) as an instrument for RMP, and shows that results are
basically unchanged from OLS results in the first row. Centrality within the
European Union is the IV in row 5. This knocks down the market potential
elasticity to 0.0785, implying σ = 12.7. Row 5 uses a measure of global cen-
trality as the IV. This most exogenous of the instruments considered actually
pushes the impact of market potential back up towards the OLS results. De-
spite concerns about reverse causality, it seems that here—as in Redding and
Venables (2004)—instrumentation using physical geography advantages does
not eliminate the influence of market potential on wages.
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All of the results shown up until now are based on the cross-sectional rela-
tionship between RMP and wages. We now consider the estimated dynamic
equations for wage and employment changes in a region, respectively (15) and
(16). These specifications allow for gradual responses in to deviations from the
iso-profit equation.
The regressions reported in Table 4 control for education, year effects, and
country effects. The standard errors are clustered around regions since multi-
ple observations for the same region are unlikely to be independent. Column
(1) of Table 4 shows—in descending order—estimates b′ = γb, the short-run
elasticity of wages with respect to real market potential. The adjacent column
shows the t-statistics for the hypothesis of no effect. Compared to the sta-
tic estimates b shown in Table 2, the b′ coefficients are smaller, as expected,
and even negative for 3 industries. The average t-statistic is 2.22. To obtain
the long run elasticity one must divide by the wage adjustment parameter γ,
which equals minus the coefficient on the lagged wage. The rate of adjustment
is estimated to be fairly slow. 19 Nevertheless, it appears statistically signifi-
cant in 10 out of 13 industries. For the average industry wages adjust to close
15% of the gap between actual and equilibrium wages each year. This implies
a half-life of deviations given by ln(1− .15)/ ln(1/2) = 4.26 years. Rather than
report the long run elasticities, we instead invert to find the implied value of
the structural parameter σ for each industry. It is reassuring that in 9 out of
the 13 industries, these estimated σ are within the range that the literature
has found in estimations and used in simulations. 20
The results reported in the final two columns of Table 4 reveal a mixed and
mainly insignificant pattern of employment adjustment to deviations from the
static wage equation. There are just two industries exhibiting positive and
significant (at the 5% level) employment adjustment. Negative adjustment
occurs in a minority of cases but it is never statistically significant.
Let us now summarize the regression results. We have shown in Table 1 that
RMP does not equalize and pointed out that theoretically this would be ex-
pected in the absence of factor price equalization. Table 2 found that even
controlling for human capital, the high RMP areas pay higher wages. This
static result supported wage response as a principal path towards spatial equi-
librium. The significant dynamic wage adjustments coupled with mixed and
mainly insignificant employment adjustments shown in Table 4 corroborate
this hypothesis.
19Adjustment rates may be biased downwards due to serial correlation in the error
term uit in equation (15).
20 The most comparable study to this one is Breinlich (2005). Using income per
capita (rather than industrial wages) and NUTS2 regions (instead of NUTS1), he
estimates a σ of 6.7. Head and Ries (2001) provide a brief summary of other esti-
mates.
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6 Conclusion
The Dixit-Stiglit-Krugman model of monopolistic competition with trade costs
is the foundation of new economic geography models. It is not easy to test.
We frame our analysis around the iso-profit condition of the model and two
polar cases through which a spatial equilibrium can be reached. The first
case is where factor prices are equalized and firms (and hence production and
employment) choose locations based on the spatial distribution of demand.
The second polar case takes the location of firms as given and solves for the
maximum wage consistent with equal profits.
We investigate empirical implications of both both polar cases using data on
13 manufacturing industries and 57 regions in Europe from 1985 to 2000.
Three sets of findings indicate that wage adjustment is the main path towards
spatial equilibrium in this data. First, we show that real market potentials are
not equalized as would be predicted by the model in the presence of factor
price equalization. Instead real market potentials (RMP) vary as they would
if there were insufficient adjustment of the supply index to local demand.
Second, wages do respond to market potential, although responsiveness dif-
fers substantially across industries. For the average industry cross-section, a
10% increase in RMP raises wages by 1.2%. Over time, the adjustment to
differences between the actual and equilibrium wages occurs at a rate close to
15% per year on average, implying a half-life of deviations of about 4 years.
Employment also seems to adjust but not in a consistently significant way.
The only alternative hypothesis to market potential that we have considered is
that human capital variation drives regional wage variation. Despite data limi-
tations, our results suggest an important role for both human capital and mar-
ket potential. This concords with other recent work. However, more than one
model could predict a relationship between wages and a distance-discounted
potential term. Hence, there is a need for empirical methods that discrim-
inate between Krugman-type mechanisms and alternative models of spatial
interactions.
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